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VI.

OF INJURING THE ENEMY.

Having regard to The Hague conventions, what limits
should be in1posed upon the means o:f injuring an enemy,
including the use o:f 1nines?
CONCLUSION.

Having regard to the regulations adopted at The
Hague and to regulations which have seemed to meet
wide approval, the :following regulations in regard to
n1eans o:f injuring the enemy in maritime war may be
~uggested:

Means o:f injuring the enemy1. " The right o:f belligerents to the ·choice o:f means
o:f injuring the enemy is not unlimited."
2. It is :forbidden( a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons or projectiles whose sole object is the diffusion o:f asphyxiating
or deleterious gases.
(b) To employ arms, projectiles, or material o:£ a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.
3. Torpedoes and mines( a) It is :forbidden to use torpedoes which do not
become harmless when they have completed their run.
(b) It is :forbidden to lay mines in the high seas except
within the imn1ediate area o:f belligerent operations.
(c) It is :forbidden in the high seas and in marginal
'vaters o:f the belligerent (1) to lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed
as to become harmless one hour at most after .those who
laid them have lost control o:f the·m; ( 2) to lay anchored
automatic contact mines which do not beco1ne harmless
as soon as they have broken loose :£rom their moorings.
(d) A belligerent is :forbidden to lay mines off the
the coast or before the ports o:f the enemy · except for
strictly military or naval purposes.
It is :forbidden to lay mines in order to establish or to
maintain a commercial blockade.
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(e) When mines are en1 ployed every possible preca ution must be taken £or the security o£ 12eace£ul shipping.
The belligerents undertake to provide as far as possible that these mines shall become harmless ·within a
limited time, and, should they cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as military
exigencies permit by a notice to mariners, which must
also be communicated to the Governments through the
diplo1natic channel.
(/) At the close o£ the war the belligerent states undertake to do their utmost to remove the n1ines which
they have laid, each state removing its own mines.
As regards alfchored automatic contact mines laid by
one o£ the belligerents off the coast o£ the other, their
position must be notified to the other party by the state
which laid them, and each state must proceed with the
least possible delay to re1nove the 1nines in its own
waters.
The belligerent states upon which the obligation to
remove the 1nines falls after the end o£ the war should
as soon as possible give notice that the 1nines have so far
as possible been removed.
NOTES.

Restrictions on instr-uments of

~oarfare.-From

early
days it has been customary for writers and others, £ro1n
time to time, to propose restriction upon the instruments
o£ warfare, particularly upon the introduction o£ new
instruments. There was oppositio:O: to the introduction
o£ the musket in the sixteenth century, and £our centuries earlier objection had been raised to projectiles in
general. In 1759, even, Admiral Conflans is reported
to have ordered his captains not to use shells.
The rules for war on land developed earlier than those
£or war on the sea. These rules did not develop early,
however. The perfecting o£ a bullet which exploded on
contact with a hard substance, in Russia, in 1863, and
later o£ one which would explode on contact with a soft
substance led in 1868 to the formation o£ the Declaration o£ St. Petersburg. The declaration "\Vas the first
formal international agree1nent restricting the n1eans of
war. The actual restriction o£ the use o£ a specified
£or1n o£ projectile is not no'Y o£ an i1nportance at all
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commensurate with the enunciation of principles o£ general conduct which are set forth in the declaration:
On the proposition of the imperial cabinet of Russia an international military commission having assembled at St. Petersburg
in order to examine into the expediency of forbidding the use of
certain projectiles in time of war between civilized nations, and
that commission having by common agreement fixed the technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the
requirements of humanity, the undersigned are authorized by
the orders of their Governments to declare as follows :
Considering that the progress of civilization should have the
effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war;
That the only legitimate object which states should endeavor
to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy;
'I'hat for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest
possib1e number of men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms
'\Yhich uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable ;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary
to the laws of humanity ;
The contracting parties engage mutually to renounce, in case
of war among themselves, the employment by their military or
naval troops of any projectile of a weight below 400 grams which
is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable
substances.

The states parties to this declaration also gave evidence
that they might endeavor by later concerted action· " to
1naintain the principles which they have established,"
and endeavor "to conciliate the necessities of war with
the laws of hu1nanity."
An attempt to establish rules in regard to the treatment
of prisoners of war and other matters in 1874 did not
meet with general approval. The Geneva convention of
1864, in regard to the treatment of the wounded of
v.rmies in the field, was, however, generally accepted.
During the wars of 1866 and of 1870 in Europe various
statements were made that one or another party was conducting the war without regard to recognition of the
,principles of civilized warfare, but as there was no agreement as to what these principles were, it was iinpossiLle
to establish or controvert the statements. There was 'a
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general acknovvledgment that the principles of the Geneva convention and of the declaration of St. Petersburg
should be observed.
Gradually there was formulated in different states
codes of laws for use in time of war, similar in some
respects to Lieber's Code of 1863 in the United States.
Attempts to formulate such codes by international agreement followed the establishment of the Institute of International Law in 1873. The Brussels Manual of 1874 and
the Oxford Manual of 1880 are examples of such codification.
Godfrey Lushington's Manual of Naval Prize Law,
prepared for the British navy in 1866, furnished a basis
for subsequent codification. The· Manual was revised and
amplified by Prof. Holland in 1888 and has subsequently
been revised.
Such codifications showed that definite statements in
regard to the conduct of hostilities might be formulated.
The den1and for formulation a:ild definition of rights of
belligerents and of neutrals became more imperative.

Restrictions and First Hague Conference, 1899.-Besides the proposal to limitation of armaments, the Czar's
circular of January 11, 1899, suggested the interdiction
of new firearms, new explosives, as well as powder more
powerful than then in use, the limitation of certain formidable explosives, and of the discharge of projectiles
from air craft, the prohibition of submarine mines and
boats, and the prohibition of the use of rams. The subjects were con$idered at the Conference of 1899.
The Hague convention o£ 1899, concerning the laws
and custon1s of war on land, provided:
ART. 22. The right of the be1ligerents to adopt menns of injuring
the enemy is not unlimited.

This same article was reaffirmed in the conference of
1907.
Both Conferences also declared it prohibited "Art. 23
(e) To em ploy arms, projectiles, or material of a nature
to cause superfluous injury." While these restrictions
were dra,-vn primarily to apply to war on land, yet it has
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been 1naintained that the principles apply to maritime
warfare.
The contracting states agreed at the Conference of 1899
"to prohibit for a tern1 of five years the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new
methods of a sin1ilar nature." This agreement expired
while the Rnsso-J apanese war was in progress, but
neither po"\1\rer took advantage of this fact. The declaration \vas rene,ved at the conference of 1907, to continue
for a period extending to the close of the Third Peace
Conference.
The improvement in systems of aerial navigation are so
great that it is doubtful whether this declaration will be
reneV\red. The declaration was conceived as one which
would 1nitigate the horrors of war, in the s~:une spirit as
the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868. If projectiles
~an be discharged from balloons with no risk beyond the
nrdinary 'var risk, it is n1aintained that there is no reason
for the prohibition of such discharge. That projectiles
should not be launched fro1n balloons against undefended
or unfortified places would accord with the present laws
of 'var and ·would prevail even if there were no convention in regard to balloons.
The proposition that aerial warfare be prohibited altogether, as being a first practical step toward the limitation of annan1ents, was not sufficiently supported to secure adoption in 1907, and since that time 1nuch effort has
been devoted to the improven1ent of air craft. Few large
states have ratified the declaration prohib~ting the discharge of projectiles and, explosives fron1 balloons.
An1ong the states that have ratified the declaration are
the United States, Great Britain, and ]Trance. Like the
other conventions, this declaration is not binding except
an1ong contracting states. Italy n1ade use of air craft in
the 'var 'vith Turkey in Tripoli. Most of the large states
have constituted aerial corps in connection 'vith their
other forces.
The Hague Conference of 1899 agreed upon a declaration prohibiting the use of projectiles, the sole obj~ct of
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·which is the diffusion o£ asphyxiating or deleterious
gases.
The declaration has not been signed by the United
States, though it has been signed by the other States represented at the First :flague Conference. The American
delegation at the First Hague Conference, 1899, opposed
this declaration, and Capt. (-A. dmiral) Mahan states these
reasons:
These reasons were, briefly: 1. That no shell emitting such
gases is as yet in practical use or has undergone adequate experiment: con,;;equently, a Yote taken now would be taken in ignorance
of the fa cts as to whether the results would be of a decisive character or \Yhether injury in- excess of that necessnry to attain the
end of warfare-the immediate disabling of the enemy-would
be inflicted. 2. That the reproach of cruelty and perfidy, addressed against these supposed shells, was equally uttered formerly against firearm;:; and torpedoes, both of which are no\Y employed without scruple. ·cntil we knew the effects of such
asphyxiating shells, there was no saying whether they would be
more or less merciful than missiles now penni tted. 3. That it
was illogical. and not demonstrably humane, to be tender about
asphyxiating men with gas, when all were prepared to admit that
it was allowable to blow the bottom out of an ironclad at midnight,
throwing four or five hundred into the sea, to be choked by water,
with scarcely the remotest chance of escape. If, and when. a shell
emitting asphyxiating gases alone has been successfull~y produced,
then, and not before. men will be able to vote intelligently on the
subject. ( Holls' Peace Conference, p. 494.)

To these reasons of Admiral JVlahan 1night be added the
fact that even ·when projectiles 1nay discharge gases ·which
1nay be deleterious or asphyxiating~ it is very difficult to
prove that this is the" sole object" of the discharge. The
lyddite shells which have been used diffuse asphyxiating
gases, but that is not the sole object in the use of th1s high
explosive, and its use is not regarded as contrary to law.
The same has been said in regard to melinite and roburite.
Another restrictive declaration of the First Hague
Conference, 1899, related to bullets with a hard envelope.
In this declaration " the contracting parties agree to abstain fron1 the use of bullets 'vhich expand or flatten
easily in the hnn1an body, such as bullets ·with a hard en-
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velope ·which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced
with incisions."
This declaration, also, the United States has not signed,
though the other 25 States represented at the Conference
have signed. The United States opposed the form rather
than the purpose of the declaration.
Torpedoes.-'l'orpedoes were objected to in early days
of their use as contrary to the principles of .humane
warfare. It was claimed that these constituted a hidden danger, to which an enmny should not be exposed.
The subject of regulation of the use of torpedoes has
been generally considered with that of the use of submarine 1nines ·with 1vhich in many respects, except that
of move1nent in a certain direction, they are similar.
The discussion o:f the principles relating to torpedoes
may, therefore, be coupled ·with that o£ mines.
11/ines.-'"fhe Naval ''Tar College in 1905, International
La·w Topics, Topic VIII, pages 147 to 153, gave attention to the general snbj ect of use , of mines, and International I.Ja·w Situations o£ 1908~ Situation V~ pages 98
to 113, gave considerable attention to the use o£ mines
for blockading purposes. The discussion o£ the conference in 1908 seemed to lead to the conclusion that mines
should not be used for the maintenance of a ~trictly colnmercial blockade.
Report to II ague. Oonfe1'ence, 1907.-The reporter of
the co1nmittee having in charge the question o£ formulation of regulations for the use of 1nines at The Hague
in 1907 said, in regard to snl-nnarine n1ines:
Les principes unanimement acceptes penYelit etre resumes
comme suit:
( 1) Il y a nne distinction fonda men tale a fa ire entre les mines
nutpmatiques (le contact amnrrees et les mines non-arnarrees;
ces dernH~res peuYent etre employees 11artont. mais elles doiYent
f:tr'e COllStruiteS de fa~On U cleYenir inoffenSiYeS dans Ull lapS de
temps extreniement limite; i1 doit en etre de mE-me des torpil1es,
qni ont manque leur but.
( 2) Quant :1 nx mines am:Hr(•es. nne limitation est necessaire
nans l'eRpace, c'est-a-dire concernant les lieux ou il sera loisible
de les placer. l\fais,
( 3) Com me cette limitn tion ue peut )l:l ~ t'tr€' :tl1so1 ne et corum·e.
dans tous les {'as, eJle n'exclnt pas l:l pos~ihiJitf> de plncer des
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mines amarrees la ou la n avigation pacifique doit pouvoir compte r
sur une libre circulation, il faut, ici encore, a voir recours a une
limitation dans le temps, c'est-a-dire a une limitation du temps,
rsendant lequel la mine est dangereuse, ce qui ser:iit possible,
grace aux inventions techniques modernes. On a egalement pu
decider unanime1nent :
Que toute mine amarrees doit etre construite de faQOn a devenir inoffensive dans le cas ou, rompant ses mnarres, elle ir ait
flottter librement.
Par cette heureuse combinaison des limitations apportees quant
a l'espace, avec les conditions techniques, que nous venons de
mentionner, un progres tres sensible a ete effectue sur l'etat
actuel des choses. A plusieurs reprises on fit notamment ressortir
le grand progres que constituerait, vis-a-vis de la situation actue11e, ·!'obligation d'employer des mines amarrees, qui deviennent
inoffensives aussit6t qu'elles auraient rompu leurs amarres.
( 4) Ces dispositions sont encore completees par des regles,
egalement votees a l'unanimite et etablissant !'obligation des
Etats, qui emploieraient des mines amarrees, non seulement de
prendre toutes las mesures de precautions possibles, notamment
en signalant les regions dangereuses (article 6) mais aussi d'enlever, a la fin de la guerre, les mines amarrees qu'on aurait
placees et, en tout cas, de pourvoir, dans la mesure du possible, a
ce qua les mines employees deviennent inoffensives apres un laps
de temps limite, afin qu'elles ne restent pas dangereuses longtemps apres la fin de la guerre.
( 5) En fin, des dispositions transitoires, engageant a appliquer
ces regles de plus tot possible et donnant . en meme tamps les
delais necessaires pour la transformation du materiel existant,
ainsi que le vmu de voir r eprendre la question, avant !'expiration
du terme, forcement assez court, pour lequel la convention pourrait etre· conclue ont pu rallier I'assentiment general des Etats
representes au Comite d'Examen. (Deuxieme Conference de la
Paix, Tome III. p. 376.)

There was a marked difference of opinion in regar d to
the use of submarine mines, some States favoring an extreme limitation, others a wide freedom.
Germany.-The German delegation at. The Hague.yonference in 1907 opposed the British idea of limitation as
being too strict. Marschall de Bieberstein said :
La Delegation allemande s'est vue dans le necessite de
s'opposer :\ une grande partie des dispositions visant a restreindre
l'emploi des mines. Je tiens a expliquer en peu de mots la portee
de nos reserves et notamment a defendre notre :1ttitude contre
cette interpretation qu'a !'exception des restrictions que nous
acceptons, nons demandons une liberte illimitee pour l'emploi de
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ces engins. Nous n'avons pas l'intention, pour me servir d'une
expression de M. le DeH~gue de Grande-Bretagne "de semer A
profusion des mines dans toutes les mers."
Ce n'est pas le cas. Nons ne sommes pas d'avis que tout ce
qui n'est pas expressement prohibe, est permis.
Un belligerant qui pose des mines, assume une responsabilite
tres lourde envers les nentres et la navigation pacifique. Sur ce
point nons sommes tous d'accord. Personne n'aura recours a ce
moyen sans des raisons militaires absolument urgente~. Or, les
actes militaires ne sont pas regis uniquement par leR stipulations
du droit international. II y a d'autres facteurs: la conscience, le
bon sens et le sentiment des devoirs imposes par les principes de
l'humanite seront les guides les plus surs pour la conduite des
marins et constitueront la garantie la plus efficace contre des
abus. Les o:fficiers de la marine allemande. je le dis a vois haute,
rempliront tonjours, de la maniere la plus stricte, les devoirs qui
decoulent de la loi non-ecrite de l'humanite et de la civilisation.
Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que je reconnais entierement
}'importance de la codification des regles a suivre dans la guerre.
Niais il faut bien se garder d'edicter des regles dont la stricte
observation pourrait etre rendne impossible par la force des
choses. Il est de premiere importance que le droit international
maritime que nous voulons creer ne contienne que des clauses
dont l'execution est 1nilitairem€mt possible, meme dans des circonstances exceptionnelles. Antrement le respect du droit serait
amoindri et son nutorite serait ebranlee. Anssi nous parait-il
preferable de garder a present une certaine reserve en attendant
que dans cinq ans on soit mieux en mesure de trouver une solution qui soit acceptable pour tout le monde.
l\1ais pour donner la }Weuve serieuse que ln Delegation a1lemande contribuera Yolontiers a tontes les mesures acceptables qui
peuvent rassurer l'opinion publiqne~ elle se declare prete a interdire pour cinq nns, c'est-a-clire pour ln duree de cette convention,
tout emploi de mines non-amarrees. Elle propose done de remplacer l'alinea 1 du premier article par les mots: " Il est interdit
pour une duree cTe cinq ans de 11lacer des mines automatiques de
contact non-nmnrrees. (Ibid., p. 382.)

Discussion at The Hague, 1907.-The discussion at The
Hague in 1907 and the votes showed a wide divergence
of opinion upon the subject of regulating the use of
mines. China pointed out that many ships, with their
crews, had been lost in waters about China by reason of
mines ·which had been placed during the Russo-Japanese
War and that unanchored n1ines formed a dangerous
menace to peacefnl shipping.
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The report of the committee said :
D'un a utre cote, l'on devait se rendre compte du fait incontestable, que les mines sons-marines constituent un moyen en guerre,
dont on ne saurait ni esperer ni peut-etre desirer, dans l'interet
meme de la paix, la prohibition absolue: moyen surtout de defense,
peu couteux et tres efficace, extremement utile pour proteger des
cotes etendues et propre a epargner des depenses considerables
qu'exige l'entretien de grandes marines de guerre. Certes, la
defense ideale des cotes, la defense qui ne peut jamais produire
de dommage aux navires pacifiques, est celle que l'on obtient par
des mines fixes qui eclatent au moyen de l'electricite. l\Iais
l'emploi de pareilles mines est necessairement limitee a la vicinite
de la terre, et la encore il n'est pas toujours possible ni suffisant.
C'est dire que les mines automatiques de contact sont une arme
indispensable . Or, viser a une prohibition absolue de cette arme,
serait par consequent demander }'impossible; il faut se borner a
en reglementer l'emploi. (Ibid., p. 398.)

Hague con1)ention, 1907.-At the Second Hague Conference a convention was adopted relative to the laying
of automatic ·contact submarine mines. The essential
regulations of this convention are as follows:
ARTICLE I. It is forbidden:
1. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when
they are so constructed as to become harmless 1 hour at most after
those who laid them have lost control of them;
2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their
moorings;
3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they
have missed their mark.
ART. 2. It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the
coa st and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting
commercial shipping.
ART. 3. When anchored automatic contact mines are employed,
every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping.
The belligerents undertake to provide, as far as possible, that
these mines shall become harmless within a limited time, and,
f:'hould they cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger
zones as soon as military ·exigencies permit by a notice to mariners, which, must also be communicated to the Governments
through the diplomatic channel.
ART. 4. Any neutral power which lays automatic contact mines
off its coasts must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as are imposed on belligerents.
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The neutral power must inform mariners by a notice issued in
a dvance, where automatic contact mines will be laid. This notice
must be communicated at once to the Governments through the
diploma tic channel.
ART. 5. At the close of the war the contracting powers undertake to do their utmost to remove the mines which they have laid,
Each power removing its own mines.
As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the
belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to the other party by the power which laid them and each
vower must proceed with the Jeast possible delay to remove the
mines in its own waters.
ART. 6. The contracting powers which do not at present own
perfected mines of the type contemplated in the present con'"t'ention and which. consequently, could not at present carry out
the rules laid down in articles 1 and 3, undertake to convert the
materiel of their mines as soon as possible, so as to bring it into
conformity with the foregoing requirements.

The report of the commission of The Hague Conference
which had the matter of submarine mines under consideration admitted that it had not reached more than a
tentative and conditional conclusion.
The position of the Naval War College on the use of
mines, as set forth in the International Law Topics of
1905, pages 147 to 153, was presented to The Hague
Conference (Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Tome III,
p. 384-387). This position was stated in the War College conclusion in 1905 as follows:
1. Unanchored contact mines are prohibited, except those that
by construction are rendered innocuous after a limited time, certainly before passing outside the area of immediate belligerent
activities.
2. Anchored contact mines that do not become innocuous on
getting adrift are prohibited.
3. If anchored contact mines be used within belligerent jurisdiction or within the area of immediate belligerent activities, due
precaution shall be taken for the safety of neutrals. (International Law Topics, 1905, p. 147.)

Limitations of convention relative to submarine
mines.-It should be pointed out that the co1ivention negotiated at The Hague in 1907 places practically no restriction upon the use of mines by states which have not
mines of late models which conform to the requirements
of the convention. Under such circumstances it is diffi-
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cult to prohibit the use of any kind of a mine by a state
because no inventory of 1nines po::?sessed by different
states has been 1nade.
The restriction purporting to prohibit conunercial
blockade by 1nines can be easily evaded by alleging other
reasons, w·hich n1ight in most cases exist.
Besides, several of the great po·wers have n1ade reservations in regard to this convention "7'hich li1nit its operation.
There is no regulation in regard to the laying of 1nines
in straits. Straits are supposed to be open to innocent
passage of neutral ships. If the area of jurisdiction of
n1arginal sea is increased the jurisdiction over wider areas
in the nature of straits is granted and a possibility of
more extended use of 1nines arises.
Institute of International Law, 1910-13.-The Institute
of International Law considered the question of regulation of the use of mines at the session at Paris in 1910
and at Madrid in 1911. The vote of the Institute finally
enunciated the following articles as suitable for the regulation o£ the use of mines:
A.-ARTICLES VOTES

A

PARIS .

.A.RTICLE 1. Il est interdit de placer en plein mer des mines auto·
l.uatiques de contact, amarrees ou non, la question des mines a
commande electrique etant reser-ree.
ART. 2. Les belligerants peuvent placer des mines dans leurs
eaux territoriales et dans celles de l'ennemi.
1\iais il leur est interdit, meme dans ces eaux territoriales:
1°. De placer des mines automatiques de contact non amarrees,
a moins qu'elles ne soient construites de maniere a devenir inof·
fensives, une heure au p1axilnum apres que celui qui les a placees
en aura perdue le controle.
2°. De placer des mines de contact amarrees qui ne deviennent
pas inoffensives des qu'elles auront rompu leurs amarres.
A.RT. 3. Il est interdit de faire usage, aussi bien dans les eaux
territoriales qu'en pleine mer, de torpilles qui ne deviennent pas
inoffensives lorsqu'elles auront manque leur but.
ART. 4. Un'belligerant ne peut placer des mines devant les cotes
et les ports de son adversaire que pour des buts navals et militaires. Il lui est interdit de les y placer pour eta ulir 01.1 maintenir
un blocus de commerce.
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ART. 5. Lorsque les mines automatiques de contact, amarrees ou

non amarrees~ sont employees, toutes las precautions doivent ~tre
prises pour la securite de la navigation pacifique.
Les belligerants pourvoiront notamment a ce que les mines deviennent inoffensives apres un laps de temps limite.
Dans le cas Oll les mines cesseraient d'~tre surveillees par eux,
les belligerants signaleront les regions dangereuses, aussitot que
les exigences militaires le permettront, par un avis a la navigation
qui devra ~tre aussi communique aux Gouvernements par la voie
diplomatique.
B.-ARTICLES VOTES

A

L.A. SESSION DE MADRID DE 1911.

ART. 6. L'' Etat neutre pent placer des mines dans ses eaux territoriales pour la defense de sa neutralite. II doit, en ces cas,
observer les menles regles et preudre les memes precautions que
celles qui sont imposees a ux belligerants.
L'Etat neutre doit faire connaitre a la navigation par un avis
prealab1e les regions oil seront placees les mines automatiques de
contact. Cet a vis devra etre communique d'urgence a ux Gouvernements par la voie diplomatique.
ART. 7. La question du placement de mines dans Jes detroits est
rcservee, tant en ce qui concerne les neutres que les belHgerants.
ART. 8. A la fin de la guerre, les Etats belligerants et neutres
feront tout ce qui depend d'eux pour enlever, cbacun de son c6te.
!es mines qu'ils auront placees.
Quant aux mines automatiques de contact amarrees que l'un
des belligerants aurait laissees sur les c6tes de l'autre, !'emplacement en sera notifie a l'autre partie par l'Etat qui les aura posees,
et cbaque :Etat devra proceder, dans le plus bref delai. a l'enlevement des mines qui se trouvent dans ses eaux.
Les Etats belligerants et neuires auxquels incombe !'obligation
d'enlever les n1ines apres la fin de la lutte devront faire connaitre
la date a laqualle l'enlevement de ces mines sera termine.
ART. 9. La violation d'une de~ regles qui precedent entraine la
responsabilite de l'Etat fautif.
L'Etat qui a pose la mine est jusqu'a preuve contraire presume
fautif.
Cette responsabilite pourra etre mise en jeu, m~me par des
particuliers, devant le tribunal international competent. (Annuaire de Droit International, vol. 24. pp. 301, 302.)

The Institute o:f International Law also cqnsidered the
question o:f regulation o:f the use o:f mines in the session
of 1913. A project had been laid before the Institute
in 1912 in practically the same :form as the rules voted
in 1911. In 1913 question was particularly raised in

DISCGSSION OF I~ STIT1JTE OF INTERN ATIO:N AL L A 'V.

145

regard to the text 'vhich appeared as article 8 in 19i l and
as article 27 of the rnanual proposed in 1913.
The discussion of this article led to an amendment.
The report says:
L'alinea final disait: "Les Etats belligerants auxquels incombe
!'obligation d~enle-ver les mines apres la fin de la lutte devront faire
connaltre la date a laquelle l'enleyement de ces mines sera termine."
Les clerniers mots de cette disposition etaient amphibologiques.
Quelle est exacternent la notification prescrite par l'alinea? Les
:Etats sont-ils tenus d'annoncer a l'avance que l'enlevement de~
mines sera terrnine u'ici tel ou tel delai; ou leur suffit-il, une fois
que cet enH~Yement a ete termine, de faire connaitre qu'il en est
ainsi? ~I. IIagerup a · done demande que le texte soit corrige dP
m.aniere qu'il ne puisse plus preter a discussion. La Commission
s'est rangee a !'opinion de l\1. Hagerup, malgre les reserves que l\L
Edouarcl Ro1in Jaequemyns a ern devoir faire sur la competence
de la Commission pour faire subir un changement a nne resolution
a ussi recemment yotee par l'Institut: elle a estirne qu'il s'agissait
ici d'un eclaircissement et non d'une modification.
Quel sens conyenait-il de donner au texte de l'article 27? Deux
propositions ont ete, a cet egard, soumises a la Commission.
L'une. presentee. par ~I~I. Holland et Kaufmann, imposait aux
puissances une double notification: notification pour faire connaltre le commencement et le delai approxirnatif de l'enleYernent
des mines, notificntion pour annoncer que l'enleyement est effectiven1ent terrnine. L'autre, libellee par l\1. Hagerup, n'exigeait des
Puissances qu'une seule notification, une fois que l'enlevement des
mines est termine. C'est cette derniere proposition que la Commission a adoptee. Il lui a paru que la notification d'un delai approximatif pour l'enleYement des mines serait plus dangereuse qu'utile:
l'Etat qui fait connaitre son intention de proceder a l'enlevement
des mines dans un certain delai ne peut, en effet, jamais savoir, a
raison des difficultes inherentes a cet enlevement, si effectivement
il aura lieu au terme indique: en attendant, et malgre la notification, la navigation demeurera done perilleuse. Il serait bon,
cependant, que les Etats ne fassent pas trop longtemps attendre
l'enlevement des mines: pour bien marquer cette idee, l\fM. Paul
Fauchille et Hagerup avaient propose de dire que "les Etats
auxquels incombe !'obligation d'enlever les mines apres la fin
de la lutte devront faire connaitre la date a laquelle l'enlevement
des mines est termine"; en imposant l'indication de la date, on
snura si la· notification a suivi immediatement l'enlevement des
mines et s'il a ete procede a celui-ci assez tot apres la fin de la
lutte. l\Iais l\f. Edouard Rolin Jaequemyns a fait observer que
les mots "la date" se referaient plutot au futur qu'au passe.
La Commission a, des lors, decide d'inscrire simplement que la
19148-14- -10
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notification sera faite "dans le plus bref delai possible " et qu'elle
indiquera que l'enlevement des mines aura ete termine "dans la
mesure du possible." La redaction de l'alinea votee par Ia Com·
mission a, en consequence, ete la suivante: "Les Etats belligerants
a uxquels incombe !'obligation d'enlever les mines apres la fin de la
lutte devront, dans le pins bref delai possible, faire connaitre que
l'enleYement de ces mines a ete termine dans 1a mesure du
possible.

In 1911 the regulation of the use of mines controlled
by electricity was reserved. In 1913 mines of this class
were not mentioned.
Resume.-The discussions at the Naval War College in
previous years and printed in the International Law Situations, 1905, pages 147 to 153, and 1908, pages 98 to 113,
:furnish a general view of the subject. The discussions
at The Hague show the vie\vs of various states and the
conclusions of the Conference of 1907. The propositions
before the Institute of International Law and the discussions upon these show the progress of opinion, which
seems to be toward greater restrictions. The 1novement
in this direction seen1s also to be sanctioned by the representations 1nade by governments fron1 ti1ne to time.
The general attitude seen1s to be that, ·while ·w ar 1nust
be pursued vigorously, the effects should be such as conduce to the military end and that the c0ndnct of war
should be, with all regard for life and property, consistent \vith military necessity. Certain rules have been generally approved; others are in the process of developn1ent.
Oonclusion.-Having regard to the regulations adopted
at The Hague and to regulations \vhich have seen1ed to
n1eet wide approval, the following regulations in regard
to means of injuring the enemy in mariti1ne \var may be
suggested:
Means of injuring the enemy:
1. " The right of belligerents to the choice of 1neans of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited."
2. It is forbidden( a) To employ poison or poisoned \vea pons or proj ectiles whose sole object is the diffusion of asphyxiating or
deleterious gases.
·
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(b) To mnploy anns, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.
3. 'I'orpedoes and min.es:
(a) It is forbidden to use torpedoes which do not becon1e harmless \Y hen they have co1npleted their run.
(b) It is forbidden to lay mines in the high seas except
'.Yithin the imn1ediate area of belligerent operations.
(c) It is forbidden in the high seas and in marginal
waters of the belligerent (1) to lay unanchored automatic
contact mines except when they are so constructed as to
become harmless one hour at most after those who laid
them have lost control of them; (2) to lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as
soon as they have broken loose from their moorings.
(d) A belligerent is forbidden to lay mines off the
coast or before the ports of the enemy except for strictly
_ 1nilitary or naval purposes.
It is forbidden to lay mines in order to establish or to
maintain a com1nercial blockade.
(e) vVhen mines are employed every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping.
The belligerents undertake to provide as far as possible
that these mines shall beco1ne harmless ·within a limited
time, and, should they cease to be under surveillance, to
notif-y the danger zones as soon as 1nilitary exigencies
permit by a notice to mariners, which 1nust also be communicated to the govern1nents through the diplomatic
channel.
(/) At the close of the war the belligerent states undertake to do their utmost to remove the mines which they
have laid, each state ren1oving its own mines.
As regard~s anchored automatic contact m]nes laid by
one of the belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to the other party by the state
which laid them, and each state must proceed \vith the
l8ast possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters.
The belligerent states upon which the obligation to
remove the mines falls after the end of the war should
as soon as possible give notice that the mines have so
far as possible been removed.

